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INTERVENTION AND DETENTE
IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Robert S. Wood
In the century after the 1648 Treaty
of Westphalia, the European state system was established on the basis of the
political principle of territoriality and of
the legal principle of sovereign equality.
The former notion entailed the effective
control by the major princes within
established territorial limits and the
second concept established the norm of
complete political jurisdiction by the
prince and his government within these
territorial boundaries unencumbered by
any earthly, external authority. Although states were unequal in material
capabilities and political influence, they
confronted each other in the international arena under the obligation to
recognize each other as masters within
their territorial domains. And, in the
intercourse of nations, agreements were
to be based on the norm of contracts,
explicit or implicit, among equal partners, whatever the actual power political

realities underlying their calculus. States
organized according to exclusive internal authority and interstate relations
organized not by a supranational power
but by the sovereign agreement of these
states-this was to be the pattern of
modern international relations. Linked
with this pattern were the notions of
nonintervention and domestic jurisdiction-princes may meet each other in
battle and adjust the political map of
Europe but they must resist the urge to
influence too blatantly the character of
each other's type of regime and ideological commitment by direct or covert
intervention. That this conception of
international affairs was only imperfectly realized is obvious but that it
provided an influential normative frame
of action is also clear.
The evolution of the principles of the
modern state system is attributable in
the first instance to the experiences of
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the emergent states from the 14th to
the 16th centuries. The attempt by the
various princes to separate their do·
mains from an empire and a church with
supranational pretensions and the division of Christendom in the reformation,
suffused the politics of the period with
a harsh ideological cast and rendered
problematical political regimes and territorial boundaries, all of which culminated in the Thirty Years' War. The
partial stalemate among states and the
jeopardy in which intervention placed
every regime persuaded Europe's political leadership to evolve a system which
would better guarantee the stability of
the states. The key was to separate
international relations from internal
politics. The separation was never complete and the smaller states were never
as certainly covered by the new norms
as the great states, but international
relations in rough-and-ready fashion did
conform to the new pattern until the
wars of the French Revolution and
Napoleon.
With the French Revolution, the
nature and character of regimes became
again a stake in the international conflict and ideological concerns once again
interacted with power political motives.
The defeat of Napoleon largely restored
the prerevolutionary notions which,
despite the strains of nationalism, class
ideologies, and racial doctrines, persisted until World War I. Since that great
war, however, the world has been buffeted by supranational ideologies and
ambitions cloaked in universal principles
whose very intensity erodes political
boundaries and casts in doubt the distinction between domestic and international politics. Moreover, with the rise
of a multitude of weak and divided
states unable to establish domestic order
and resist foreign incursions, the problem of distinguishing levels of political
activity and limiting political ambitions
has been exacerbated. Some have
further cited the interdependence of the
international economy as another

element -in the erosion of the classical
principles of the modern state system.
In such a "revolutionary" situation,
then, what is the role of the doctrine of
nonintervention?
Henry Kissinger and Nonintervention: From Cold War To Detente. In a
real sense, the cold war is a result of the
convergence of ideology and ambition
such as characterized the period prior to
the Peace of Westphalia and the French
Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars. The
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan
were thus elements in an increasingly
global revolutionary struggle the objective of whose combatants was not only
extended direct territorial control but
modification of political regimes and
socioeconomic structures. In such a
context, American support, covert and
open, to liberal political forces in
Western Europe was seen by the concerned public as both necessary and
proper. Even the extension of assistance
to regimes more authoritarian in nature
was widely seen as a justifiable attempt
to limit Soviet influence.
The experiences of Vietnam and the
political as well as economic costs of
intervention in areas of high political
instability led many opinion leaders,
however, to reassess America's international role. There simultaneously occurred a parallel reevaluation by some
Western commentators of Soviet ambitions. The convergence of these trends is
most visibly seen in the detente policy
of the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
If American foreign policy since
World War II has been largely inspired
by polar confrontation and doctrines of
political and economic reconstruction
and nation-building among the nonCommunist states, recent detente policy
is aimed in the words of its primary
expositor, Henry Kissinger, at the encouragement of "an environment in
which competitors can regulate and
restrain their differences and ultimately
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move from competition to cooperation.,,1 The primary focus of American
policy thus becomes less the containment-and, in effect, isolation-of the
Soviet Union than the development of a
nexus of relations which are designed to
"create a vested interest in cooperation
and restraint.,,2 And whereas the earlier
containment doctrine largely represented a negative policy vis-a-vis the
East and placed dominant emphasis on
the development and maintenance of
alliance ties with Western Europe,
Japan, and other states of important
strategic interest, the practical result of
recent policy is to reverse the emphasis
and increasingly assess our alliance relations' in terms of their contribution to
Soviet-American detente.
This approach is ultimately founded
on three assumptions: .First, that in the
words of the Secretary of State "the
Soviet Union has begun to practice
foreign policy-at least partially-as a
relationship between states rather than
as international civil war,,3 and that, in
any case, common interests in survival
and some degree of predictability are
more important factors in U.S.-Soviet
relations than basic changes in their
regimes or ideological motivations;
second, that a strong Western military
posture and a continuing intimacy
within the Western alliance will be
maintained; and, third, that a separation
between domestic and international
politics and a clearer acceptance of
spheres of influence in the policies of
the Soviet Union and the United States
can be established.
In a recent reply to those critics who
assert that political and economic concessions by the United States to the
Soviet Union should be linked to a
modification of Soviet domestic policies
of emigration and, perhaps, dissent,
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
argues: "Where the age-old antagonism
between freedom and tyranny is concerned, we are not neutral. But other
imperatives impose limits on our ability

to produce internal changes in foreign .
countries. Consciousness of our limits is
recognition of the necessity of peacenot moral callousness.,,4 In effect, Dr.
Kissinger contends that a stable international system thus depends in this view
on an agreement about international
rules of behavior-not a common notion
of justice which could well place in
doubt the authority of the several
regimes comprising the system. To
attempt to devise agreements which
establish both rules of international
conduct and norms of domestic rectitude is seen as likely to increase frustration and exacerbate conflict, especially
in an international environment characterized by fundamentally different
regimes. At the same time, however, it is
clear that Dr. Kissinger has not elevated
the doctrine of nonintervention to a
categorical imperative but limits it to
great power, i.e., Soviet-American, relations and couples the notion with an
implicit understanding on spheres of
influence. The distinction between
domestic and international politics and
the concomitant rule of nonintervention
are thus prudential and limited rather
than principles and universal. It is not
that an absolute doctrine of nonintervention is simply rejected in the abstract
but that conditions of state security, as
well as state aspirations, are viewed as
ruling out complete submission to such
a precept. Indeed, the classical notion of
power politics has always maintained a
distinction between great and small
powers and included concepts of
spheres of influence. Inhibitions on
ideological preferences and restrictions
on direct interference in domestic
politics arise in this view not from
abstract notions of justice but from
caldulations of prudence-which do include, it must be noted, the elaboration
of prudential rules of international behavior and guides for alliance maintenance. In this conception then, Secretary Kissinger is not alone but in a long
and dominant foreign policy tradition.
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Although the imperative of nonintervention is traditionally linked with the
notions of legal sovereignty and
equality, all three conceptions are ultimately founded on a situation of international anarchy and on the principle of
self-help. Both Naturalists and Positivists historically expressed this relationship by reference to the doctrine of
state "rights" which are not.normative
commands in any meaningful sense at
all but simply prudential imperatives
arising from the problem of selfpreservation in the midst of anarchy.
Such prudential imperatives need not,
however, be calculations of short-term
self-interest but in fact may demand
attention to some modicum of predictability and order in the international
sphere and thus concern for the longterm implications of state actions. While
anarchy may imply self-help, scholars
and statesmen alike have been concerned with informing the notion of
self-help with such restraints and limitations that it does not also entail chaos.
Nonintervention is thus recommended
less by reference to legal commitment
than to prudential calculations. 5
The Soviet Polity, Peaceful Coexistence, and the Doctrine of Nonintervention. The concept of nonintervention espoused by Secretary Kissinger
appears therefore to be motivated by
calculations of prudence and qualified
by an implicit doctrine of spheres of
influence. An important question is
whether or not the Soviet Union is
animated by similar considerations. On
the face of it, the statement by Leonid
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the
Soviet Communist party, before The
Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe appears to accept a
more unqualified and principled commitment to nonintervention. Speaking
of the conference and its final act, Mr.
Brezhnev declared:
The experience of the work of the
conference provides important

conclusions for the future too.
The major one that is.reflected in
the final document is this: No one
should try to dictate to other
peoples, on the basis of foreign
policy considerations of one kind
or another, the manner in which
they ought to manage their internal affairs. It is only the people
of each given state, and no one
else, that has the sovereign right
to resolve its internal affairs and
establish its internal laws. A different approach is a flimsy and
perilous ground for the course of
international cooperation. 6
By reiterating a principal provision of
the conference declaration, some delegates were led to wonder whether Moscow was signaling its intention to forego
its prerogative to intervene militarily in
East Europe in order to maintain Communist governments friendly to the
Soviet Union. Although Prime Minister
Harold Wilson of Great Britain felt that
such a declaration by the General Secretary would make invocation of the
so-called Brezhnev doctrine more difficult in the future, most observers apparently believed that the real intent of
the statement was to inform the West
that the human rights section of the
conference declaration could not be
used to press for the liberalization of
the East European regimes. If this latter
interpretation is accepted, it might still
be argued that Brezhnev was, however,
prepared to accept a generalized nonintervention doctrine also qualified by a
sphere of influence notion. If so, this
convergence of views, along with the
fear of nuclear war, might provide a
basis for a long-term Soviet-American
detente. One can be excused for some
degree of skepticism on this point as
well.
The Soviets have consistently insisted
that "the sphere of class and nationalliberation struggle" cannot be brought
within "peaceful coexistence" and that,
indeed, detente has given "a powerful
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impulse to the national-liberation movement of colonial and oppressed
peoples. " Brezhnev has argued that
detente is a result of "a new relationship
of f-orces"-that is, the ascendency of
the Soviet-Socialist forces. Hence, as an
Izvestia commentator recently contended, "the process of detente does
not mean and never meant -the freezing
of the social-political status quo in the
wqrld" and in fact nothing cQuld .or
should prevent the Soviet Union from
giving "sympathy, compassion, and support" to these forces of "nationalliberation." In this view, then, detente
or peaceful coexistence involves direct
state relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union, particularly in the strategic area, but is not
designed to prevent Soviet support for
"favorable developments" in various
third states. 7
The American Polity, Contemporary
International Politics, and the Doctrine
of Nonintervention_ If some commentators doubt the commitment of the
Soviet regime to a doctrine of nonintervention, even one qualified by notions
of spheres of influence, we can also
justly raise questions whether such a
doctrine is compatible with the character of the American polity. In a remarkable article entitled "Was Woodrow
Wilson Right?" Daniel P. Moynihan
argued:
Wilson conceived of patriotism
not as an instrument of the state,
but as an expression and extension of the moral capacities of the
individual, specifically of men
seeking freedom in its many manifestations. He saw that in the age
then commencing such a patriotism would be meaningful only as
it manifested itself in a world
setting, engaging its energies in a
world struggle. Democracy in one
country was not enough simply
because it would not last. In
20th-century America Wil-

sonianism has been disparaged for
enthusiasm, much as high Anglicans disapproved of the Methodists of 18th-century England.
And yet the Methodists, had they
been ordained, almost surely
would have kept the English
people in the church, and possibly
also their bishops. Instead the
people wandered away into
nothingness. Does not the American faith in democracy face something of this dilemma, and are we
not adopting much the same
course at the silent behest of men
who know too much to believe
anything in particular and opt
instead for accommodations of
reasonableness and urbanity that
drain our world position of moral
purpose?8
Wilsonianism expressed a belief common from the early days of the Republic-that the American experiment in
government was not for the United
States alone but provided a standard
and harbinger for the nations of the
world. Thomas Jefferson, reflecting on
the meaning of the Declaration of Independence, wrote in 1826:
May it be to the world what I
believe it will be: to some parts
sooner, to others later, but finally
to all-the signal of arousing men
to burst the chains ... The mass
of mankind has not been born
with saddles on their backs for a
favored few, booted and spurred,
ready to ride them by the grace of
God but to govern themselves by
the grace of God, and they will by
the grace of God. 9
Abraham Lincoln speaking of the
Declaration in 1861 expressed a similar
belief: "Something in that Declaration
[gave] liberty, not alone to the people
of this country, but hope to the world
for all future time. It was that which
gave promise that in due time the
weight should be lifted from the
shoulders of all men, and that all should
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have an equal chance."l 0 Lincoln then
expressed the belief that, while the
Declaration offered a vision, it did not
in itself provide guidance for the construction of free government. That task
was only accomplished in the text of
the Constitution of the United States.
In similar vein, Americans have traditionally viewed not only the Declaration
of Independence as potentially universal
in scope but also the principles and
structures of constitutional government.
The American experiment in constitutional democracy has thus been viewed
not only in domestic but in global
terms.
In a real sense, the American ap·
proach to government and international
affairs has represented in almost quintessential form the modern liberal perspective in politics-animated by
notions fundamentally different from
those which undergird Soviet and much
of non-Western society but confident
that those liberal notions represent the
basis for just societies everywhere. The
belief in the universality of rationalism
and individualism which characterized
the 18th century Enlightenment received its best expression in the Ameri·
can political experiment and its finest
rhetorical statement in the words of the
Declaration of Independence: "We hold
these truths to be self-evident .... " The
19th century elaboration of these Enlightenment principles in the notions of
the free flow of peoples, goods, and
ideas became standards by which we not
only judged the performance of our
government but other regimes as well.
To a substantial degree, however,
confidence in the liberal notion of
politics and law has been eroded within
Western society itself and the applicability of such notions to much of the
rest of the world cast in doubt. It is a
fact, nonetheless, that the malaise concerning liberal thought affected the rest
of the Occident earlier and much more
profoundly than the United States.
Indeed, a renewed sense of confidence

was kindled after the Second World
War, very much under the leadership of
the United States. It is true that in the
late 1960's, America began to suffer the
same crisis of confidence which had
gripped European society earlier. It is,
however, the contention of such ob·
servers as Daniel Moynihan that the
a bandonment of important liberal
beliefs is not in fact fatalistically reo
quired by the world situation and that
such a surrender would be harmful to
the foundations of the American polity
itself. If the vision of Wilson can no
longer be accepted in unqualified
fashion, neither can it be completely
jettisoned without damage to the
American soul and indeed to the quest
for a legitimate world order. A foreign
policy whose appeal is primarily to
realpolitik, power balances, spheres of
influence, and avoidance of war may in
this view be not so much irrelevant as
inadequate.
Even assuming, however, that American and Western foreign policy should
be animated by the very principles of
their own political founding, it is still a
matter of debate as to what degree of
external activism and indeed intervention this requires. The United States,
for instance, as many liberal socie.ties,
has fluctuated in its policies between
relative noninvolvement in international
politics, on the one hand, and messianic
engagement on the other. In the first
case, one heard the argument that external political entanglement would
damage material interests and risk moral
contamination and that exemplary behavior at home would act as a beacon
and redeeming model for the rest of the
world. In the case of more extensive
external. engagement, this was recommended on the basis of direct threats to
the core values of American society and
the necessity of reestablishing an international environment in which the
natural spiritual and material links
among peoples would no longer· be
subordinated to authoritarian control.
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Indeed, many Enlightenment and
19th century liberal commentators
addressed themselves to the question as
to what conditions, if any, would justify
not only extensive foreign policy activism in general but direct intervention
within other societies. Archetypical examples of the various approaches might
be found in the writings of Richard
Cobden, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel
Kant, and Joseph Mazzini.
Basically, Cobden stated the most
uncompromising theory of nonintervention-one founded on the partiality of
states in defining universal notions of
right and on the relative efficiency of
nonintervention in serving over the longrun the material interest of peoples. It
must be noted that a basic assumption
undergirding Cobden's view was that,
transcending interstate relations, there
is a plethora of relations between
peoples. Goods, people, and ideas are to
cross frontiers freely, thus ameliorating
state conflicts and bindjng nations together: "as little intercourse as possible
betwixt the governments, as much connection as possible between the nations
of the world." Hence, coupled with his
doctrine of nonintervention was a
liberal world vision which provided for
the interpenetration of peoples. 1 1 Mill,
Kant, and Mazzini, while accepting
much of Cobden's vision, provided in
varying degrees for a policY of state
intervention.
Mill enunciated the doctrines of
limited humanitarian intervention to
protect lives and property from barbarous acts of violence and to end deadlocked civil wars and of counterintervention to uphold the rule of nonintervention. I2 Kant perhaps eroded the
limitation on intervention even further
by his notion that stable rules of international behavior depend on a radical
revision of international society into
republican regimes. Moreover, the
league of states in Kant's schemes might
also possess a right of intervention in
behalf of the republican order. 1 3

Mazzini completes this evolution by
arguing that the rule of nonintervention
had become an instrument of the status
quo employed by the great powers to
protect "legitimate" governments while
restricting transnational liberal ties and
assistance. I4 In effect, the erosion of
the Cobdenite principle stemmed from
the dynamics of anarchical competition
itself and the conflicting political visions
of the state actors.
Although there is little question that
the counsel of Richard Cobden is most
appealing to Americans today, it must
also be noted that the conditions underlying Cobden's advice are missing
throughout much of the world-the free
flow of peoples, ideas, and goods. The
transnational society about which so
much has been written in recent years is
not really universal in its scope. Indeed,
much of Henry Kissinger's diplomacy
might be construed as an attempt to
establish various links-economic, technical, political, cultural-between the
West and the East in such a way as to
bring gradually the states of Eastern
Europe into a more transnational
society, in the preservation of which
they would then have a stake. The fact
of the matter, however, is that these
states are still only marginally connected with that transnational world
and that much of the character of their
regimes militates against the same type
of interlinkages allowed by liberal politics. At the same time, the homogeneity
of political principle and aspiration
which might allow the acceptance of a
sphere of influence doctrine and limited
noninterventionism, does appear still to
be lacking. Indeed, under such conditions, Mazzini's observation that the
rule of nonintervention may be used to
protect and legitimize authoritarian control is apt and much akin to commentaries on Brezhnev's public espousal of
nonintervention.
In effect, to the degree that the
United States and the West are still
motivated by classical liberal notions of
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politics, the counsels of John Stuart Mill
and Immanuel Kant are likely to be
attractive-that is, the notion of counterintervention to uphold the principle
of intervention and the Kantian vision
of the spread of republicanism as a
precondition of international stability.
If in fact Soviet foreign policy is still
inspired by Leninist political principles
and the United States is similarly influenced by liberal perspectives, then
any detente must be conceived as
limited in nature and much more closely
akin to what the Russians call peaceful
coexistence. The notion of peaceful
coexistence does not rule out areas of
cooperation where material interests
converge or where the fear of destabilizing and potentially suicidal warfare becomes dominant. But one must
be skeptical as to whether anything
more intimate sustains current American-Sovie.t relations. The belief held by
both sides in varying degree that "what
is mine is mine and what is yours is
subject to historical transformationwith some fraternal assistance," is likely
to continue in force. Indeed, the examples of Portugal, and especially
Angola, may very well be cases in point.
Despite announcements on the unlamented end of the cold war, we are
probably still living in a revolutionary
international system. As Henry Kissinger wrote many years ago: "The characteristic of a stable order is its spontaneity; the essence of a revolutionary
situation is its self·consciousness. Principles of obligation in a period of legitimacy are taken so much for granted
that they are never talked about, and
such periods therefore appear to posterity as shallow and self-righteous. Principles in a revolutionary situation are so
central that they are constantly talked
about." lS
If the future is to see the continuance of revolutionary clashes among
different notions of public order, are we
then subject to the conclusion which
Kissinger reached in that same earlier

study?-"And because in revolutionary
situations the contending systems are
less concerned with the adjustment of
differences than with the subversion of
loyalties, diplomacy is replaced either
by war or by an armaments race. ,,16
The character of nuclear armaments, the
desire of the superpowers for a modicum of stability in their relations, the
challenge of other international pressures, and the press of internal demands
-all these forces may indeed sustain a
limited detente which impedes war and
stabilizes arms races. Indeed, it is these
forces which provide the foundation for
Kissinger's detente strategy-but it must
be emphasized that the predominantly
Hobbesian nature of these inducements
fails to preclude a rather intense political contest which makes talk of nonintervention and even accepted spheres
of influence premature.
Henry Kissinger has, in effect, been
arguing that the involvement of the
United States in the complications of
power politics and equilibrium policy is
permanent and can only be reversed at
the peril of our national security.
Should we either withdraw from the
game of nations with all of its moral
contradictions or should we act on
assumptions of natural harmony, universal justice, or too blatant a notion of
American uniqueness, we may
jeopardize the survival both of our
political influence and of our national
values. The reduced margin of our
power has meant that both a completely
negative policy of containment toward
our adversaries or a perception of total
consensus with our allies will destroy
our flexibility and endanger our
national interests. In the past, he has
argued,
... we had margin for error
... we acted as if the world's
security and economic development couId be conclusively insured by the commitment of
American resources, know·how,
and effort. We were encouraged-
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even impelled-to act as we did by
our unprecedented predominance
in a world shattered by war and
the collapse of the great colonial
empires. At the same time the
central character of moral values
in American life always made us
acutely sensitive to purity of
means-and when we disposed of
overwhelming power we had a
great luxury of choice. Our moral
certainty made compromise difficult; our preponderance often
made it seem unnecessary. 1 7
It is the passing of this preponderance coupled with the permanent
necessity to engage in the complex
maneuvers of diplomatic-strategic relations which defines our current problems-and which, in Kissinger's view,
compels not only a modification of
policy but a transformation of our
traditional views of world politics. In
such a world, we would better see
ourselves in the European tradition of
equilibrist statesmen who sought not
only concert with allies but collaboration with enemies-a world of controlled' conflict and limited cooperation
rather than a community of justice or a
world of unambiguous enemies and unshakable friends. In Kissinger's view,
i?creasing' interdependence, declining
resources, and the rising demands and,
in some cases, power potential of the
"Third World" states make power
politics and the equilibrist perspective
more rather than less compelling.
To an extraordinary degree, Kissinger's perspective has defined the problem not only for the Republican
Administration but the Democratic
Party opponents. Although Jimmy
Carter speaks of a "democratic concert
of nations" and international human
rights as a primary focus of American
policy-themes to which the Administration has responded in this Presidential election as well as bicentennial
year-both Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Carter foreign policy advisor, have

appealed to equilibrist notions not dissimilar to' those of Henry Kissinger.
However, there still persists a tension
between Kissinger and his bipartisan
foreign policy critics which goes beyond
details of policy. There is what appears
to be an almost instinctive reaction
against the implications of Kissinger's
doctrine for the definition of the nation
itself. From the beginning of the nation,
the American polity has been defined
not only as a nation among nations but
as a great experiment in government
with relevance not only to this people
but to peoples everywhere. Our sense of
ultimate political harmony arising from
consent, of the application of rational
techniques, and of special political
destiny, are all intimately tied to that
great revolutionary experiment of 1776
and its completion in constitutionmaking in 1787. In this view, it is not to
the European past that we should turn
but to our own.
James Madison defined the constitution-making task thusly:
To secure the public good and
private rights against the danger of
[a passionate majority] and at the
same time to preserve the Spirit
and form of popular government
is the great object to which our
inquiries are directed.
In similar vein, the foreign policy task is
to reconcile the soul of American
democracy with the exigences of involvement in a world which shares few
of our assumptions. Hostility to Kissinger may in part stem from a belief that
he is too little concerned with that
soul-despite his latter-day sermons on
American destiny and moral purposeand too willing, in order to meet the
demands of international politics, to
adopt alien political models. In fact,
however, both the claims of American
democratic-republicanism and the
exigences of an increasingly insecure
globe must be met. As we enter the
third century of our national existence,
the task we face is no less complex-or
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exhilirating-than the one faced by
James Madison and his cohorts.
It is thus probably unrealistic to view
detente as foreclosing struggles over the
character of regimes both within and
without presumed spheres of influence.
Debate within Western societies would
be better directed less toward the desirability of intervention than toward the
modalities of such involvement. It
appears inevitable that under current
conditions this must involve attention
to tactics of intervention and counterintervention. In a world where transnational flows are important and growing,
the Cobdenite eschewal of state intervention in favor of the interpenetration
of peoples has much to commend it.
Where such communication is impeded
and assistance is rendered to various
national groups who would further restrict the transnational flow of goods,
people, and ideas, then the problem for
Western governments becomes the development of effective instruments to
influence the domestic evolution of
various critical countries. In the current
debate within the United States over
how to restrict American involvement
abroad, including the intelligence
apparatus of the United States, one may
lose sight of the fact that the United
States has an interest in developments
within certain countries, as indeed does
the Soviet Union. It is a legitimate
concern that the modalities of American
influence be compatible with the very
principles they are intended to uphold.
Moreover, an American policy too exclusively dominated by realpolitik may
have fewer constraints and lead to more
extensive commitments than one animated by attention to the first principles of the American regime. On the
other hand, if such attention is given,
then one cannot totally ignore the
warning of Alexander Solzhenitsyn:
We are also threatened by the
catastrophe that the physically
squeezed, constrained world is not
allowed to become one spiritually;

molecules of knowledge and COmpassion are not allowed to move
across from one half of the world .
to the other. This is a grave
danger: THE STOPPAGE OF
INFORMATION between the
parts of the planet. Contemporary
science knows that such stoppage
is the way of entropy, of universal
destruction. Stoppage of information makes international signatures and treaties unreal: within
the zone of STUNNED SILENCE
any treaty can easily be reinterpreted at will or, more simply,
covered up, as if it had never
existed (Orwell understood this
beautifully). Within the zone of
stunned silence lives-seemingly
not Earth's inhabitants at all-a
Martian expeditionary force,
knowing nothing whatever about
the rest of the Earth and ready to
trample it flat in the holy conviction that they are "liberating"
it. I8
At the same time, if the character of
the international system impels concern
for interventionary policies and their
prudential and principled limitations, it
would be a mistake to elevate intervention itself to a matter of first principle
and general norm of international conduct. If the international 'society makes
it unlikely that Cobden's advice will be
widely accepted, so one must recognize
the dangers of too enthusiastically embracing notions of revolutionary intervention and counterintervention. Perhaps the only position is to maintain
ambiguity rather than sanction nasty
conduct or impose impossible rules of
behavior. In any case, nothing in the
character of the Soviet and American
regimes or in the political and economic
structures of the emerging states indicates that the requisite stalemates,
tolerance, or internal stability have been
achieved so that international regimes of
nonintervention after the fashion of
Westphalia may yet be established. Pre-
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mature movement in that direction will
not reaffirm the doctrine of noninter-

vention but will consecrate the victory
of one form of intervention.
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